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Ramanuja and Schleiermacher On Language:
Comparative Theology for Constructive Theology
Jon Paul Sydnor
Emmanuel College
THE truth of the Veda is affirmed in the
aphorism, 'The relation of words to facts is
natural [autpattika: inherent, original,
primordial] (Mimamsa Sutras 1.1.7)'. Just as
fire and water do naturally possess their
properties like heat, just as the senses like
sight and hearing are naturally productive of
particular kinds of cognition, words also
have a natural power of imparting
knowledge. 1
The whole work of the Redeemer
Himself was
conditioned
by
the
communicability .of His self-consciousness
by means of speech, and similarly
Christianity has always and everywhere
spread itself solely by preaching. Every
proposition which can be an element of the
Christian preaching (kerygma) is also a
doctrine, because it bears witness to the
determination of the religious selfconsciousness as inward certainty . . . Thus
this communication is, on the one hand,
something different from the piety itself,
though the latter cannot, any more than
anything else which is human, be conceived
entirely separated from all communication.
But, on the other hand, the doctrines in all
their forms have their ultimate ground so

exclusively in the emotions of the reiigious
self-consciousness, that where these do not
exist the doctrines cannot arise. 2
Introduction

If comparative theology is to produce
constructive theology, then must that resulting
constructive theology be syncretistic? This
question may very weli prove to be
consequential for the future of comparative
theology. If comparative theology can prove
itself to be methodologically potent in
theological construction, then this utility will
legitimate its practice. However, if comparative
theology is solely able to produce syncretistic
constructive theology, then the practice of
comparative theology will be limited to those
who are open to such syncretism. This audience
may prove to be small. If so, then comparative
theology may never integrate with the broader
theological world.
A second option may be available. If
comparative theology can produce discrete, nonsyncretistic constructive theology, then the use
of this potent method may expand dramatically,
as it would include those who might shy away
from syncretism. The purpos~ of this paper is to
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explicitly demonstrate the discrete or nonsyncretistic
constructive
potential
of
comparative theology. It will do so by placing
two theologians-the Srivaisnava Ramanuja and
the ReformedlLutheran Schleiermacher-into
conversation with each other on the subject of
language. In so doing, the paper will
demonstrate that comparative theology has the
potential to produce constructive theology.
Moreover, this constructive theology need not be
syncretistic.
In demonstrating this possibility we
recognize that, in certain theological quarters, an
allergy
to
syncretism
already
exists.
Nevertheless, in this paper no allergy to
syncretism is being prescribed. Indeed, judicious
syncretism may very well be an appropriate
constructive move. The purpose of this paper is
definitively not to establish the uselessness,
superfluity, or even ancillary nature of
comparative constructive theology. The purpose
of this paper is to demonstrate .that an
interreligious dialectic can further theologies
along their pre-existing trajectories, along
. parallel paths that need not converge. In other
words, post-comparative theology may be
discretely constructed. The paper will conclude
that comparative theology can advance religious
thought either syncretistic ally or discretely,
according to the disposition of the comparativist
and her target audience.
Comparison

Schleiermacher and Ramanuja have
pronouncedly divergent doctrines of language.
For Ramanuja, Sanskrit is eternal. As eternal, it
is uncreated by Brahman but preserved through
periods of dissolution and re-creation in the
mind of Brahman. Sanskrit is the means of
creation itself, and as such Sanskrit imprints
reality with its own grammar, rendering creation
and Sanskrit unitary in structure. For
Schleiermacher, all language is a historical
phenomenon, changing from place to place and
from time to time. Language is not the medium
of creation; it is an aspect of creation. Indeed,
Schleiermacher deems the "Mosaic" (Hebrew)
account of creation-which, in Genesis Chapter
One, is mediated by language-to be irrelevant
to the feeling of absolute dependence, and hence
https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol22/iss1/10
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irrelevant to dogmatics. 3 (This dismissal is not
due to the divine use of language, but due to the
presentation of creation as an' event in time
rather than the eternal preservation of the
cosmos.)
Because Schleiermacher deems language to
be an aftermath of creation, he sees no
correlation between· the grammar of any
language and the grammar of reality. Ramanuja,
asserting such a correlation,' subordinates
religious consciousness to language. He asserts
that the consciousness of the Vedantin is to be
structured by the Sanskrit of the Veda, as
augmented by auxiliary texts such as the
dharmasastras,
itihasas,
and
puranas. 4
Schleiermacher
disagrees,
subordinating
language to the religious consciousness. He
asserts that the unarticulated Christian
consciousness is possessed of tremendous
language-forming potential which culminates in
dogmatic theology.
This distinction has enormous implications
for the respective missiologies of Ramanuja and
Schleiermacher. For Schleiermacher, the feeling
of absolute dependence upon our God who is
love is inherently translatable into any culture in
any time and any place. The Christian Godconsciousness is, if you will, a content without
form. It must be granted form through the
culture in which it manifests itself. 5 This
manifestation can occur through any culture. In
fact, so perfectly translatable is this content that
no culture is to be preferred over any other
culture, and no language is to be preferred Over
any other language. Christ's consciousness is as
articulable in 19th century Germany as it is in 1st
century Palestine, in German as it is in Aramaic.
Indeed, Christ's consciousness is as articulable
in Tamil as it is in Sanskrit. For Schleiermacher,
the feeling of absolute dependence is plastic,
assUming the form of whatever culture it
encounters. 6
Ramanuja's Brahman-consciousness, if we
may call it that, does not share the plasticity of
Schleiermacher's God-consciousness. Instead,
for Ramanuja,the consciousness of the
moksapara (seeker of liberation) must be
Sanskritized. So, this consciousness can only be
manifested through one linguistic form rather
than many linguistic forms. Ramanuja's
valuation of Sanskrit is a result of, and dovetails
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with, his holistic exegesis of the Veda.
Ramanuja retains the karma kanda, or ritual
portion of tKe Veda, and the jnana kanda, or
knowledge portion of the Veda, as necessary but
ancillary adjuncts to the bhakti kanda, or
devotional portion of the Veda. Crucially, these
rituals and this knowledge are in Sanskrit and
cannot be translated. That is, analogous
sentences in other languages will of necessity
lack the salvific phenomenological import of the
Sanskrit. 7
While later Visistadvaitins may have
asserted that these three kandas could be
bypassed by means of prapatti, there is no
explicit allowance for such a circumvention in
Ramanuja's own work. Quite the contrary, there
is prescribed a multifaceted devotional practice
which prepares the moksapara to receive moksa
(release). And this preparation involves the
inculcation of Sanskritic "mental impressions"
(samskaras) preserved from beginningless time. 8
Only Sanskrit has an inherent relation to reality,
both spiritual and material. Therefore, only
Sanskrit vocabulary· in Vedic word order
generates those "mental impressions" which are
preparatory to release. For this reason, the
be
release-seeking
consciousness
must
Sanskritized. No other language will serve.
While neither Ramanuja nor Schleiermacher
allow for contradictions in their theological
systems, both present different understandings
of the problem of contradiction. For Ramanuja,
any contradiction in the scriptures must be
apparent rather than real, since scripture is
derived immediately from Brahman, from whom
no
contradiction could appear.
These
contradictions can be resolved through the
application of reason to all relevant scriptural
passages, by which means all contradictions can
be resolved in one holistic exegesis. 9
Schleiermacher believes that contradictions are
symptomatic of poetic and rhetorical forms of
Christian expression which are so occasional as
to
lack
systematic
preclSlon.
These
contradictions can be resolved through the
collocation of poetic, rhetorical, and Christ's
own expressions into one rigorous system of
"descriptively didactic" doctrine-or, in other
words, a dogmatic. lO
Several other issues are raised through the
comparison of Ramanuja and Schleiermacher's
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doctrines of language. For one, a comparative
reading of Ramanuja's doctrine of Sanskrit as
eternal calls into question Schleiermacher's
attempt to stabilize temporal German through
dialectic and systematization, without reference
. to any abiding verbal meaning. Ramanuja also
recognizes the instability of everyday, historical
words, as he notes the difference in definition
between Sanskritic words in their Vedic context
and the same words in everyday use. However,
his solution to the challenge of historical
language is more radical. He ascribes to
scripture an eternal meaning which is accessible
through rigorous exegetical practice. Successful
exegesis requires intensive, sequential study of
the Veda (Purva Mimamsa first, then Uttara
Mimamsa), a learned guru, study of the Puranas
and other texts which expound the Veda, and the
activation of all acquired knowledge through
upasana, or devotional meditation. In this way,
the inherent meaning of Vedic words in Vedic
sentences can be discerned, which will stimulate
a phenomenal experience which, activated
through devotional meditation, leads to
salvation. 11
In contrast, Schleiermacher's understanding
of language as historical, coupled with his
demand of a fixed meaning for words, seems
problematic. Although Schleiermacher never
explicitly .describes language as a historical
phenomenon, that he understood it to be so
seems a legitimate inference from his highly
historical understanding of human thought.
Indeed, Schleiermacher defmes dogmatic
theology as "the science which systematizes the
doctrine prevalent in a Christian Church at a
given time.,,12 From this statement we may infer
that (within certain parameters) dogmatic
theology, as well as its vocabulary, will be
different in different places at different times.
This variability obtains despite the invariable
feeling of absolute dependence upon our God
who is love that underlies all Christian feeling
and hence, all Christian theology. While
implicitly asserting the historical nature of
language, Schleiermacher also asserts both the
need to and the possibility of stabilizing a
word's meaning through placing it in dialectical
relationship with other words, within the context
of a coherent system of theological propositions.

3
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Problems arise when we consider twin
characteristics of Schleiermacher's doctrine of
language, which may very well be exclusive. To
begin, Schleiermacher's concept of dogmatics
necessitates a dialectical linguistics within a
system of propositions which is self-contained
(abgeschlossen: secluded, solitary, enclosed).13
Dogmatics is to comprise a complete system
(Vollstandigkeit des Lehrgebaudes)14 that
provides an absolute context (in einem absoluten
Zusammenhang)15 for all propositional language,
thereby establishing a perfectly defmite relation
among them (unter ihnen vollkommen bestimmt
sind).16 This self-containment we may deem the
"introverted" character of Schleiermacher's
theology. That is, in order to be perfectly precise
and perfectly stable, it must be perfectly selfreferential. The finitude of the internal referents,
coupled with the vast number of their mutual
relations, generates a fixed system in which each
referent is defined, directly or indirectly, by
every other referent. And through this system
meaning becomes precise, stable, and scientific.
But at the same time, Schleiermacher also
prescribes an "extroverted" theology. He
specifically states in the Glaubenslehre's
Introduction that dogmatics will eagerly seek to
utilize the language of ethics, philosophy of
religion, apologetics, psychology, etc. in order to
discuss how religious feeling becomes
diversified and what object it refers to. In other
words, dogmatics will borrow the scientific
terminology of these realms in order to more
precisely express itself. His own Introduction
does not qualify as dogmatics, under
Schleiermacher's own definition, because it is
not a disclosure of the specifically Christian
consciousness. Nevertheless, in order to
introduce his dogmatics Schleiermacher borrows
propositions from ethics, philosophy of religion,
apologetics, and psychology.
Problematically,
Schleiermacher
is
borrowing vocabulary from outside his finite,
self-contained system. But such borrowing
opens up the system to vocabulary which is no
longer fixed through defmite relationship. The
introduction of anyone term which is not fixed
by relation will, of necessity, destabilize the
entire system. Thus the tension between
Schleiermacher's introverted need for a finite,
fixed, precise terminology and extroverted need
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for borrowed scientific terminology seem to be
at odds. It is not that faith and science are at
odds; Schleiermacher would eschew any tension
between faith and science, and much of his
program is directed toward resolving that
perceived tension. But there is a tension between
the static nature of perfectly stable dogmatic
language and the dynamic nature of
investigative scientific language. Within this
context, any stability one might achieve will be
but momentary, and momentary stability is
oxymoronic.
Schleiermacher himself notes this danger, as
he notes that changes in philosophical language
often result in changes in dogmatic language. 17 It
is possible that external vocabulary is borrowed
first, and then stabilized through incorporation
into the system. But the ongoing life of the term
outside of the system will still threaten any fixed
definition. Even "absolute contexts" have
contexts within the realm of language and
culture.' This observatio:n only raises the tension
between scientific precision and linguistic
dynamism. Dogmatics must adapt to history, and
dogmatics must be exact. But historical
dynamism precludes perfect precision.
If historical language is, iri fact, an imperfect
medium of religious communication, then
Schleiermacher faces a more profound problem.
He specifically states that "the whole work of
the Redeemer Himself was conditioned by the
communicability of His self-consciousness by
means of speech [Rede] , and similarly
Christianity has always and everywhere spread
itself solely by preaching [Verkilndigung].,,18 In
other words, Christ effects redemption through
the communication (Mitteilung) of his sinless
perfection. 19 But perfection would seem to
necessitate
a
perfect
medium
for
communication. Incongruously, Schleiermacher
does not ascribe this perfection, or its possibility,
to language. While Schleiermacher notes that
communication also occurs through gesture and
countenance, the centrality of preaching renders
speech fundamental to religious communication.
With
reference
to
individuals,
Schleiermacher states that "the discovery of this
differentiating 'matter [between individuals] in
any individual existence is a task which can
never be perfectly, but only approximately,
discharged in words and sentences.,,20 But if
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Christ cannot perfectly distinguish himself from
imperfect human beings, then by what means'
can his perfection be discerned? Since his selfconsciousness was origiIially conveyed by nontechnical, non-dogmatic, imperfect speech, then
how was the perfection of his self-consciousness
mediated by the imperfection of that form of
language? Insofar as such questions cast doubt
on the possibility of redemption, they threaten to
undermine Schleiermacher's entire dogmatic
system.
To a certain extent, this point is moot. After
all, the power of language to communicate
redemption is ratified by Christ's use of
language, not Schleiermacher's doctrine of
language. 21 However, at this point it is not clear
that Schleiermacher's doctrine of language
dovetails with Christ's legitimation of language.
A comparative reading of Ramanuja and
Schleiermacher on this point suggests that
clarification is needed; comparison has
presented a constructive opportunity. However,
Schleiermacher would not likely tum to
Ramanuja's "magical" doctrine of language in
order to resolve any contradiction within his
own. We might expect instead a more
naturalistic approach. Perhaps he would indeed
deem stability to be but momentary, or define
perfect stability as. a goal to be approached
asymptotically. Whatever the reconciliation, the
postulated constructive response to Ramanuja's
challenge would not likely be syncretistic given
Schleiermacher's own concerns about "alien"
(fremd: foreign, strange, external) influences.
(Again, this is Schleiermacher's position, not the
position of this essay.)
Another interesting point of contact arises
between Ramanuja and Schleiermacher. We
noted above that due to the assertion of
consonance between Sanskrit and reality,
Ramanuja is able to make linguistic arguments
with ontological consequences. For example, he
argues. that because language is differentiated,
and because differentiated language describes
Brahman
must
be
Brahman,
then
differentiated. 22 Schleiermacher, like the
Advaitins, ascribes simplicity to God. 23 But he
offers a very different interpretation, closer to
the Srivaisnava position, insofar as he defmes
simplicity as "the unseparated and inseparable
mutual inherence of all divine attributes and

!
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activities.,,24 Nevertheless, we may be tempted
to ask based on reading Ramanuja: can
Schleiermacher ascribe such simplicity to God
by means of differentiated language?
It would appear as if Schleiermacher is not
bound to address this question, since he does not
share Ramanuja's linguistic ontology. That is,
arguments cannot be made from the nature of
language to the nature of reality for two reasons.
First, Schleiermacher's dogmatics is not
concerned with the objective nature of reality
but with the felt experience of salvation. Second,
Schleiermacher ascribes no ontological acumen
to language. It simply does not have the
primordial generativity that Ramanuja's Sanskrit
has, and is therefore not a cipher for the nature
of the universe or of the divine.
However, Schleiermacher may also question
Ramanuja on the relationship between divinity
and language. Ramanuja describes Brahman as
eternal. 25 At the same time, Ramanuja asserts the
reliability of Vedic language as a means of
knowledge (pram ana) of Brahman. And as
noted above, he asserts that because language is
differentiated, Brahman must be differentiated
rather than undifferentiated, as the Advaitins
would claim. But we can also note that language
is temporal. Words occur in time. At the precise
moment that a word such as "eternal" (nityai 6 is
being spoken, at the center of that moment, part
of the word lies in the past, part in the present,
and part in the future. "Eternal" describes
Brahman, but as a spoken word it is divided by
time. Therefore, according to Ramanuja's
doctrine of language, we could plausibly infer
that Brahman must be divided by time. But
Brahman cannot be divided by time, because
Brahman is eternal. This (possible) quandary
may present a challenge to contemporary
Srivaisnava theologians. If so, then comparison
has produced another constructive opportunity.
Yet again, Srivaisnava theologians would not
likely respond to this challenge through any
adoption of Schleiermacher's naturalistic
doctrine of language. Instead, they would more
likely look to their own resources, perhaps
postulating an eternal form of language, of
which temporal language is but a manifestation.
In any event, their response to the
Schleiermachian challenge would be wholly
Srivaisnava, rather than Schleiermachian.

5
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Finally, the comparison of our two
theologians
raises
interesting
questions
regarding hermeneutics, stability, and precision.
As noted above, both theologians ask to what
degree precise language is necessary for
successful religious communication. In the end,
both Ramanuja and Schleiermacher demand
precision, although in very different ways.
Schleiermacher attempts to establish technically
precise language within a historical framework,
without reference to eternal, abiding meanings.
Ramanuja, on the other hand, asserts the eternal
meaning of Vedic words in Vedic word order.
Oddly, this eternal meaning generates an
exceptionally dynamic exegetical tradition.
Srivaisnava scriptural interpretation changes
over time. For Srivaisnavism, does this
dynamism suggest error and its correction, or
can change reflect the continuous development
of an originally authentic yet insufficiently
articulated exegetical impulse (in accordance
with Schleiermacher's understanding of the
development of doctrine through time)? In other
words, could Schleiermacher's treatment of
doctrinal development assist Srivaisnavas in
justifying their own exegetical dynamism? For
our purposes, answering such questions would
necessitate excessive speculation. In speculative
areas such as these, it is best to allow traditions
to speak for themselves. Nevertheless, once
again comparison has produced an opportunity
for discrete construction. Were Srivaisnavas to
utilize Schleiermacher's concept of doctrinal
development in order to explain their own
exegetical dynamism, then only minor
adaptation would be necessary. This aspect of
Schleiermacher's thought could be incorporated
into Srivaisnava thought, leaving it (possibly)
more articulate yet wholly faithful to the preexisting Srivaisnava theological trajectory.
Ramanuja and Schleiermacher produce
vastly different linguistics. Nevertheless, their
comparison across a vast expanse of space and
time has proven fruitful. New questions have
arisen through our comparison, questions which
might otherwise have lain dormant. We have
elicited latent aspects of each theologian. In
other words, Ramanuja and Schleiermacher have
spoken differently in inter-religious dialogue
than either would have spoken in intra-religious
dialogue.
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This outcome is extremely consequential.
The generation of a question is a precious event,
for it allows the possibility of an answer. New
questions generate new answers, and new
answers constitute constructive theology. So
comparative theology, if fruitfully executed,
inevitably leads to constructive theology.
Additionally, this constructive theology need not
be syncretistic (although it may legitimately be
so, if this is the disposition of the constructivist).
We have not had the space or presumptiveness,
in this essay, to answer the new questions.
However, we have demonstrated that the
questions generated through comparison can be
answered from the tradition's own resources,
without resorting to syncretism. This utility is
consequential-it may expand the practice of
comparative theology beyond its current
confines into those theological quarters which
are less comfortable with explicit syncretism.
The methodological potency of comparative
theology for constructive theology has therefore
been demonstrated, be it discrete (as in this case)
or syncretistic.
Notes
Ramanuja.
Vedarthasamgraha.
S.S.
Raghavachar, transl. Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna
Ashrama, 1956. Para. 227, page 177. "The
relation of words to facts is natural." Skt:
autpattikastu sabdasyarthena sambandhah. Van
Buitenen translates: "Meaning is inherent in the
word." Van Buitenen, J.A.B. Ramanuja's
Vedarthasamgraha:
Introduction,
Critical
Edition and Annotated Translation. Pune:
Deccan College Postgraduate and Research
Institute, 1992. Brahmavadin translates: "The
relationship of a word with its meaning is indeed
eternal." The Brahmavadin: A Fortnightly
Religious and Philosophical Journal. Madras:
Thompson and Company, 1896-1912. Vols. 1.1
through 17.8. Raghavachar's term "natural"
represents a loose translation, and does not mean
"derived from nature." "Autpattika" literally
means "original," or "from/at the beginning." In
other words, the universal form of the object
does not prece!ie its appellation, although the
universal form and the appellation do precede
any particular object. So, because universal form
and appellation are eternally cognate, meaning is
more primordial than natural: "The relationship
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between the word and its meaning is
primordial."
2
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. The Christian
Faith. Trans. by H. R. Mackintosh and J. S.
Stewart. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1999. §15.2,
77-78.
3 The Christian Faith. §40.3, 15I.
4 Vedarthasamgraha. §232-233, 180-18I.
5 The Christian Faith. §15.2, 77.
6 cf. Lamin Sanneh. Translating the Message:
The Missionary Impact on Culture. New York:
Orbis Books, 1989. 197-207.
7 Vedarthasamgraha. §127, 99-100. Ramanuja's
Srivaisnava tradition later came to regard Tamil
as a second language of revelation, thereby
diminishing the need for a Sanskritized
consciousness.
8 Vedarthasamgraha. Van Buitenen translation.
§139, 233. See also Brahmavadin. §231, 677.
Here, samskara is translated as "innate
impressions. "
9 Vedarthasamgraha. §277, 177.
10 The Christian Faith. §18.2, 86.
11
Ramanuja. Brahma-Sutras: Sri Bhasya.
Swami
Vireswarananda
and
Swami
Adidevananda,
transl.
Calcutta:
Advaita
Ashrama, 1995. §I.I.1, 1-3.
12 The Christian Faith. § 19 (Proposition), 88.
13 The Christian Faith. §20 (Proposition), 94.
14 The Christian Faith. §18.3, 87.
15 The Christian Faith. §28.2, 120.
16 The Christian Faith. §28.2, 120.
17 The Christian Faith. §19 (Postscript), 93.
18 The Christian Faith. §15.2, 77.
19 The Christian Faith. §88 (Proposition), 361.
20 The Christian Faith. §10.3, 47.
21 The Christian Faith. §15.2, 77.
22 Vedarthasamgraha. §19, 20-21.
23 The Christian Faith. §96.1, 392.
24 The Christian Faith. §56.1, 231.
25 Vedarthasamgraha. §157, 126-127.
26 Vedarthasamgraha. §157, 125-127. Brahman
is characterized as nitya, or eternal.
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